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I.  Introduction 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) is designed to shift more of the responsibility for poor children from 
government to parents. To accomplish this goal, the new law requires welfare clients to 
work and limits the total number of years they can receive assistance. In addition, the 
new legislation requires unwed fathers to establish paternity and strengthens child 
support enforcement among nonresident fathers. 
Although many people believe that poor children would be better off if their 
mothers worked and their fathers were more involved in their upbringing, the scientific 
evidence for these assumptions is weak. We know very little about the ability of poor 
parents to support their children, and we know even less about their ability to cooperate 
with one another. Whether recent welfare reform is good public policy will depend in 
large part on the answers to the following questions: 
 
•  What are the conditions and capabilities of low-income parents, especially fathers?   
 
•  What is the nature of the parents’ relationships in low-income families? How many 
couples are involved in stable, long-term relationships? How many fathers want to be 
involved in raising their children?   
 
•  How are policies being implemented at the local level? How will they affect parents’ 
capabilities and relationships? And how will they affect child wellbeing?  
 
This paper describes a new study – Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing – that is 
uniquely suited to answer these three questions.1 The study is designed to follow a new   3
birth cohort of approximately 4800 children, including 3675 children born to unmarried 
parents and 1125 children born to married parents, in 21 cities throughout the United 
States. The data will be representative of all non-marital births in U.S. cities with 
populations of 200,000 or more. We use the term fragile families to describe unwed 
parents and their children to underscore the fact that they are families and to remind the 
reader that they are vulnerable because of their economic status. 
Although the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study is designed to provide 
information on unwed parents and their children, these data will be an excellent resource 
for examining the effects of welfare reform for several reasons.  First, unwed mothers 
have the highest rates of welfare use of all mothers, and therefore they will be 
disproportionately affected by welfare reform (Bane and Ellwood 1994).  Second, unwed 
fathers are less likely to live with their children than other fathers, and thus they will be 
disproportionately affected by the changes in paternity and child support legislation. 
Third, the new survey interviews both fathers and mothers which will allow researchers 
to examine parents’ capabilities and relationships from two perspectives.  And finally, 
data are being collected in 21 cities with very different welfare and child support policies 
and different labor market characteristics which will allow researchers to examine the 
effects of different types of welfare regimes on parents’ capabilities and relationships 
and, ultimately, on child wellbeing.  
The next section of the paper discusses the importance of the three questions and 
describes the state of our current knowledge on these topics.  The third section describes 
the study and the data. The fourth section describes the policy and labor market 
environments in the  first seven cities where we are collecting data. The fifth section   4
presents findings from 2 cities – Austin, Texas and Oakland, California.  And the last 
section presents preliminary conclusions.   
 
II.  The Questions 
 
The Conditions and Capabilities of Poor Parents 
To assess the impact of welfare reform on families and children, we need to know 
more about the capabilities of the mothers who depend (or would have depended) on cash 
assistance and the fathers who are expected to provide more child support.  Fortunately, 
we know quite a bit about the capabilities and conditions of poor single mothers, since 
many of our existing data sets include these women in their samples.  We are woefully 
ignorant, however, about the capabilities of low-income fathers, since many of these men 
are either non-resident fathers or are loosely attached to their child’s household. Policy 
makers are particularly interested in two aspects of fathers' capabilities – their earnings 
capacity and their propensity for violence.  These two factors are fundamental to the 
success or failure of the new welfare and child support laws.  
  The first question facing policy makers is whether non-resident (and loosely 
attached) fathers can afford to provide more economic support for their children than 
they currently provide. To date, our best estimates indicate that non-resident fathers are 
younger, less educated, and less likely to work than resident fathers.  Non-resident 
fathers also report more disability, depression, and drug and alcohol use than married 
fathers. Not surprisingly, the fathers who live apart from their children have lower 
incomes than co-resident fathers, and the gap is especially wide among men at the very 
bottom end of the income distribution (Garfinkel, McLanahan, & Hanson 1998).  The   5
latter finding is particularly worrisome for policy makers since low-income men are 
most likely to be the fathers of children on welfare.   
  A second question facing policy makers is whether non-resident (and loosely 
attached) fathers are potentially dangerous.  Clearly, most mothers and children would 
be better off economically if fathers paid more child support.  However, some 
advocates for women fear that forcing fathers to pay child support may have serious 
negative consequences.  Much of this concern is grounded in the belief that a 
substantial number of non-resident fathers have serious problems with physical abuse 
and violence.  Four recent studies suggest that domestic violence among poor women 
and women on welfare is very high, with current prevalence ranging from 15% to 32% 
and lifetime prevalence ranging from 34% to 65% (Raphael and Tolman 1997).2 
All of our estimates of fathers’ earnings and capabilities are seriously limited by 
the fact that many of these fathers are under-represented and under-reported in our 
national and local surveys.3  Garfinkel and his colleagues (1998) estimate that as many as 
3.8 million non-resident fathers are not represented in the National Survey of Families 
and Households which is arguably the best data we have for  studying family 
relationships.  These researchers found that about a third of the “missing fathers” were 
not in the sampling frame, including fathers in prison, fathers in the military, and, fathers 
who are part of the census undercount (i.e. homeless men and other individuals who are 
loosely attached to households).  The other two thirds were in the survey, but did not 
acknowledge their status.  The problem is particularly serious for low-income fathers and 
for men who father children outside marriage (also see Rendall, Clarke, Peters, Ranjit, & 
Verroponlou 1997).     6
The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study will provide better information 
than previous studies on the earnings and personal problems of unwed fathers, most of 
whom are or will be non-resident fathers. First, the fathers in the sample will be more 
representative of unwed fathers because the study starts with a birth and identifies a 
specific universe of unwed fathers. Second, the information in the new survey will be 
more accurate than the information in previous studies because fathers will be 
interviewed directly and followed over time. And finally, the information will be more 
complete because data on all fathers will be collected from mothers which means that we 
will know something about the characteristics of the men who do not participate in the 
study.  
 
Relationships in Fragile Families 
Relationships in fragile families between the father and the mother and the father 
and the child are especially important to evaluating the effects of welfare and child 
support reforms. Parents who are in a stable romantic relationship and parents who want 
to raise their child together will be better able to cope with the demands placed upon 
them by the new welfare and child support legislation than parents who are not in stable 
relationships and who cannot cooperate. The latter are likely to experience much more 
stress and conflict as a result of welfare reform as compared with the former.  
Demographers estimate that about 40% of unwed parents are living together when 
their child is born (Bumpass and Lu 1998).  Another 30% of unwed fathers see their child 
at least once a week or more (McLanahan et al. 1998).  These figures suggest that 
relationships in fragile families are converging with those in European countries where   7
the vast majority of unwed parents live together in “marriage like” relationships.  
The ethnographic literature presents a conflicting picture of the nature of 
relationships between unwed parents. Anderson (1989) describes how young, inner city 
men exploit young women in order to satisfy their sexual needs and gain status with their 
peers.4 In contrast, Edin (1997) suggests that, in many instances, mothers refuse to marry 
the fathers either because the men are seen as unreliable breadwinners or because they 
have serious problems with drugs or alcohol.   These two stories are different with respect 
to which parent is making the decision. They are quite similar, however, with respect to 
the fact that marriage is not part of the future. Other researchers present a more co-
operative picture, suggesting that many unwed couples start out with high hopes for 
maintaining a stable relationship only to find that they (or their partners) cannot meet 
their earlier expectations. (Edin and Lein 1997, Furstenberg et al. 1992). In his famous 
study of street-corner life, Leibow (1967) argues that men who are unable to provide 
economic support for their families disengage as a way of minimizing feelings of 
inadequacy.  
Many of our ideas about the relationship between unwed fathers and their children 
come from research on divorced and separated fathers.  According to this literature, most 
non-resident fathers do not provide adequate or regular child support and do not maintain 
regular contact with their child. Moreover, financial support and visitation are known to 
fall off rapidly over time among divorced fathers. Whereas formal child support 
agreements are even less common among never married fathers as compared with 
formerly married fathers, informal support, especially the purchase of goods and services 
for the child, appears to be very common (Edin and Lein 1997, Waller 1997, Marsiglio   8
and Day 1997). Father-child contact is also quite high. Analyses of the NLSY-CS data 
suggest that half of non-resident, unwed fathers see their child at least once a week and 
that most of these relationships are quite stable (McLanahan et al. 1997). The high level 
of involvement among new unwed fathers is probably due to the fact that many of these 
men are still romantically involved with the mothers. Thus the comparison with divorced 
and separated fathers may not be appropriate.  When and if the relationship with the 
mother ends, the unwed fathers’ involvement may drop off rapidly, as it does among 
divorced fathers.  
The Fragile Families study will collect information from both parents about their 
views of marriage and cohabitation and their ability to co-operate. The survey will also 
collect information on parents’ expectations about fathers’ rights and obligations and 
about the  extent and nature of father/child relationships. These new data will allow 
researchers to determine if unmarried parents are able to engage in co-operative parenting 
or if such co-operation is a desirable goal that is simply beyond their reach.  
 
Welfare, Child Support, and Labor Market Regimes  
Economic theory and common sense suggest that low welfare benefits, strict child 
support enforcement, and strong labor markets promote marriage (Garfinkel and 
McLanahan 1986). Generous welfare benefits limited to single mothers undermine 
marriage and promote out-of-wedlock childbearing both by making women more able to 
afford to be lone mothers and by reducing the gains from marriage. Strict child support 
enforcement in the presence of a welfare system increases the costs to fathers of living 
apart from their child more than it increases the benefits to mothers.5 Poor employment   9
opportunities for men undermine marriage by making males less attractive and reliable 
husbands.  To the extent that poor employment prospects discourage marriage more than 
childbearing, they promote out-of-wedlock births. The magnitude of these effects is an 
empirical question of great practical concern.  
  Previous research suggests that higher welfare benefits modestly increase single 
parenthood.  (For reviews see Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986, Moffitt 1992, and 
Moffitt 1998).  There is also an emerging body of research that finds that stringent child 
support enforcement reduces marital disruption (Nixon 1997), and out-of-wedlock 
childbearing (Case 1998, Garfinkel, Gaylin, Huang, and McLanahan 1998, Plotnick, 
Garfinkel, Gaylin, McLanahan, and Ku 1998). Previous research has not addressed the 
question of whether welfare generosity and child support enforcement interact. This is 
an important question because an interaction between two relatively modest effects 
could produce a large effect. Finally, obtaining reliable estimates of the labor market 
effects on marriage has been difficult.  Wilson (1987) argues that the decline in 
marriage among black men is due largely to their declining opportunities in the labor 
market.  Lichter et al. (1991) and Mare and Winship (1992) find some support for the 
Wilson hypothesis.  However, they also find that declining employment accounts for 
only about 20% of the decline in marriage. Moreover, as Schultz (1994) argues, it is 
difficult to disentangle the positive effects of earnings on marriage from the positive 
effects of marriage on earnings (Korenman and Neumark 1991).  By concentrating 
observations in cities with  vastly different welfare, child support, and labor market 
regimes, by following parents over time as labor markets change, and by measuring 
other determinants of cohabitation and marriage, the Fragile Families study will allow   10
researchers to identify the separate and interactive effects of welfare, child support, and 
labor markets. 
These new data will also provide important information about how recent changes 
in welfare and child support policies affect parents capabilities and relationships. 
PRWORA is designed to reduce welfare dependence by forcing mothers into the labor 
force and by forcing fathers to assume financial responsibility for their children. These 
changes are likely to provide stronger incentives for parents to remain together.  Mothers 
on welfare who are required to work may prefer to live with their child's father, rely on 
his income, and stay at home; other mothers may want to live with the father, rely on his 
income, and supplement the family's income by working part time. A mother on welfare 
will also have a stronger incentive to live with the child's father if she believes that he 
will be able to provide long-term economic support beyond the new five-year time limit.  
Similarly, some fathers who find it difficult to avoid paying child support under the new 
rules for establishing paternity may decide to live with the mother and child rather than 
pay child support. Fathers, like mothers, may also be concerned about the economic 
wellbeing of their child beyond the five-year time limit.  Of course, other fathers may 
make a more determined effort to evade the child support enforcement system.  In short, 
we believe there will be stronger incentives under the new rules for mothers to live with 
the fathers of their children, and stronger incentives for at least some fathers to live with 
the mothers and children. 
If these hypotheses are correct, and if parents who live together produce an 
environment for better child outcomes, we would find that strong enforcement of welfare 
and child support regulations improves the wellbeing of children. On the other hand, it is   11
possible that stronger enforcement of both welfare and child support regulations will 
simply further impoverish both mothers and fathers and/or increase parental conflict, 
leaving children worse off. By concentrating observations in cities with extreme child 
support and welfare environments, the Fragile Families survey will facilitate the detection 
of these interaction effects. 
 
III.  The Design of the Study 
Data for the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study is being collected in 21 
U.S. cities, stratified by labor market conditions, welfare policies, and child support 
policies. The geographical dispersion of the cities is depicted in the map of the U.S. in 
Figure 1. The sample is representative of non-marital births in each city and is 
representative of all non-marital births to parents residing in cities with populations over 
200,000. A comparison group of married parents is also being followed. The total sample 
size is approximately 4800  families, including 3675 unwed couples and 1125 married 
couples.  
New mothers are interviewed at the hospital within 24 hours after they have given 
birth. Based on data collection so far, we also expect to interview between 50 and 60 
percent of the unmarried fathers at the hospitals. The rest of the fathers will be 
interviewed as soon as possible after the birth.  Follow-up interviews with both parents 
will be conducted when the child is 12 months, 30 months, and 48 months. Data on child 
health and development will be collected each year from the mother. In addition, in-home 
assessments of child wellbeing will be carried out at 48 months.  
The baseline questionnaires for mothers and fathers include sections on (1)   12
prenatal care, (2) mother-father relationships, (3) expectations about fathers’ rights and 
responsibilities, (4) attitudes toward marriage, (5) parents’ health, (6) social support and 
extended kin, (7) knowledge about local policies and community resources, and (8) 
education, employment, and income. Follow-up interviews will gather additional 
information on (1) access to and use of health care and child-care services, (2) 
experiences with local welfare and child support agencies, (3) experience with the 
criminal justice system, and (4) parental conflict and domestic violence. 
The national sample includes sixteen cities chosen on a random stratified basis 
from all cities with populations over 200,000. Prior to random selection, cities were 
ranked according to the generosity of their welfare grants, the strictness of their child 
support systems, and the strength of their labor markets. Cities with extreme values (in 
the top or bottom third of the distribution) on all three indicators were placed into one of 
eight cells (111, 333, 331, 311, 313, 131, 113, 133). Cities that fell in the middle third on 
one or more indicator were placed in the ninth cell. One city was selected randomly from 
each of the eight extreme cells, and eight cities were selected randomly from the 
remaining cell.  
As originally conceived, the sample size was to be 325 births (250 non-marital 
and 75 marital births) in the 8 extreme cells, and 100 births (75 non-marital and 25 
marital births) in the 9
th cell. Additional funding from several foundations allowed us to 
increase the number of cities with 325 births from 8 to 14. In order to save money, we cut 
back the sample size in two of the original cities from 325 to 100. We did this in cities 
where we had added foundation cities in the same cell and felt that our ability to detect 
the high-order interaction effects would not be jeopardized by reducing the number of   13
cases. Ultimately, the Fragile Family data include 12 cites with 325 births and 9 cities 
with 100 births.  
Several features of the design merit a more extended discussion: sampling from 
births, interviewing in the hospitals, and concentrating observations in cities with extreme 
environments. Sampling from births is excellent way of obtaining a representative sample 
of children born outside marriage and their parents. Such a sample is ideal for addressing 
our first and second questions regarding the capabilities and relationships of unwed 
parents. Interviewing in the hospital is efficient both in terms of reducing time it takes to 
interview parents and in terms of response rates.6 Though the sample of fathers is only 
“nearly” representative, the sample of mothers allows us to assess the severity of the 
“missing fathers” problem. In order to ascertain the extent to which the fathers in the 
sample are a select sample of unwed fathers, the mothers were asked a series of questions 
about the fathers of their child, including questions about earnings and domestic violence.  
There are three reasons for concentrating observations in cities with extreme 
environments.  First, city environments vary dramatically in a number of ways that are 
likely to affect individual behavior and family relationships. The effects of environmental 
influences such as welfare and child support policies, labor markets, sex-ratios, and 
race/ethnic composition are not well understood and could easily interact with one 
another and with individual level variables in our models. The generosity of welfare, for 
example, might have a weak effect on marriage in the context of a strong labor market 
and strong child support enforcement, but a strong effect in the face of a weak labor 
market and lax child support enforcement. Similarly, in cities with low welfare benefits 
and low unemployment, individual values with regard to marriage and cohabitation may   14
be a very important determinant of cohabitation, whereas in cities with high benefits and 
high unemployment, values may play little or no role.  Having a large sample in cities 
with extreme conditions allows us to study the processes that determine adult 
relationships and the effects of these relationships on wellbeing in each city.  In effect, 
we will have eight case studies of extreme cities. Concentrating observations in eight 
cities will also allow us to test for whether there are differences across cities in the mean 
values and effects of different variables.  
Second, concentrating observations allows us to more accurately describe the 
environment in each city. This is especially important for measuring welfare and child 
support regimes. Administrative record data do not provide population-based 
information, and they are likely to provide inconsistent information on some variables, 
such as welfare sanction rates. They also provide no information on still other variables, 
such as knowledge about the welfare and child support systems.  Large national data sets 
like the CPS provide large enough samples in some states to aggregate to the state level. 
However, our experience with the Child Support Supplement to the CPS (which has 4000 
observations per year) indicates that even after pooling 3 years of data we have very large 
standard errors in most states. Moreover, although welfare and child support policies are 
made at the state level, these policies are implemented at the local level. Thus, getting an 
accurate description of the welfare and child support regimes at the city level is important 
and requires a large number of cases in each city.   
Third, the most efficient design for detecting the effects of differences in child 
support, welfare, and labor market regimes is to concentrate observations in cities with 
extreme values (i.e. those with the highest and lowest welfare benefit levels and the   15
strongest and weakest child support and labor market regimes).  By maximizing the 
variance in these explanatory variables, we minimize the variance of their estimated 
coefficients.   
IV.  Welfare, Child Support, and Labor Market Regimes 
In this section we describe the welfare, child support, and labor market regimes in 
the first seven cities where we are collecting data.  We pay special attention to 
characterizing these cities in terms of their welfare generosity, the strictness of their child 
support enforcement, and the strength of their labor markets and to locating Austin and 
Oakland within these continua. 
Welfare Regimes 
Table 1 presents data on a number of variables that are indicators of the 
generosity of welfare in 7 cities. These cities represent the cities in which Fragile 
Families data have been collected thus far. We present policy data that describe the state 
as a whole and county-level statistics that indicate how policies are being implemented at 
the local level.  The first row presents data on the maximum benefit for a family of three.  
We believe that the welfare benefit level is the single best indicator of welfare generosity.  
For this reason, we used the welfare benefit level to stratify by generosity when selecting 
our sample of cities.  The other indicators presented in Table 1 are for the most part 
consistent with the state benefit level but substantially enrich the picture. 
Table 1 about here 
Texas (Austin) and Virginia (Richmond) stand out as the low benefit states, 
whereas California (Oakland) and Michigan (Detroit) stand out as high benefit states.  
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), New Jersey (Newark), and Maryland (Baltimore) fall in   16
between.  Benefit levels in the continental U.S. ranged from $120 in Mississippi to $639 
in Vermont in 1997 (U.S. Congress, 1998).  The seven Fragile Families states span the 
range of generosity levels. 
The second and third rows of the table present local-level child poverty rates and 
TANF caseloads per 1000 county residents.7  The caseloads are a product of both the 
poverty rate and the generosity of benefits. Philadelphia and Baltimore have the second 
and third highest poverty rates and the two highest caseload rates.  Though Richmond has 
the highest poverty rate its caseload rate is only average because of its extremely low 
benefit.  Austin, with the second lowest poverty rate and the lowest welfare benefit, has 
by far the lowest caseload rate. 
  Rows 4 and 5 present the percentage decline in caseloads between 1997 and 1999 
and the percent of applications denied in 1998.  The decline in caseloads is one bottom-
line measure of the tightening of welfare over this period, but it may also reflect 
differences in labor market strength across cities. The denial rate is a crude measure of 
administrative stringency. What stands out is that the two cities with the largest 
percentage decline in caseloads are Austin, in the least generous state, and Detroit, in the 
second most generous state.  Austin, Detroit, Baltimore and Oakland also report much 
higher denial rates than other cities. These figures suggest that some of the most generous 
cities – Oakland and Detroit – are pursuing “get tough” strategies.  
  Rows 6, 7, and 8 present data on variations in state time limits and sanctioning 
policies.  The combination of time limits and sanctioning policies is consistent with the 
generosity of welfare benefits.  Austin and Richmond impose the shortest time limits.  
When both time limits and sanctioning are taken into account, California and Michigan   17
have the most lenient policies. Detroit has no time limits whatsoever, and Oakland has no 
full family sanctions. 
  Row 9 presents data on the percent of the TANF caseload that is employed.  This 
figure is an indicator of the extent to which the city is enforcing work requirements, but 
also may be influenced by work incentives and labor market demand.  Note that the two 
low benefit cities – Austin and Richmond – have the lowest and highest proportions of 
their caseloads working, respectively.  Next to Richmond, Oakland had the second 
highest proportion of the caseload working. Richmond and Oakland have the most 
generous earnings disregard policies of the seven city/states, which may account for their 
high rates of employment for TANF recipients. 
  Finally, rows 10 and 11 present two measures of the extent to which our cities are 
supporting the work of low-income families outside welfare.  In terms of child-care, 
Detroit and Newark are the most generous cities and Richmond and Oakland are next 
most generous.  Once again, Austin stands out as the least generous.  A state earned 
income tax credit (EITC), which supplements the federal EITC, is only available in 
Maryland (Baltimore). 
  In sum, there are interesting variations within the least and most generous 
city/states.  By every measure Austin is the least generous city.  It does nothing to enforce 
or promote work other than providing extremely low benefits and restricting access. 
Richmond’s benefits, though low and also more time-limited than the other cities, are 
substantially higher than Austin’s.  Richmond both encourages work within welfare by 
providing a generous earnings disregard, and it promotes work outside welfare through 
child care subsidies.  Detroit, although a high-benefit city, is like Richmond with respect   18
to enforcing work within welfare and promoting work outside welfare. Finally, Oakland 
provides high benefits, encourages work within welfare (through earning disregards) but 
does not provide much support in terms of child-care subsidies.    
 
Child Support Regimes 
  Although we have secured some city-level data on child support enforcement, we 
are missing data in some cities and have questions about the reliability of the city data we 
have obtained.  As a consequence, Table 2 presents data on the effectiveness of child 
support enforcement at the state level.  The quality of these data is also questionable (see 
Guyer et al. 1997).   
Table 2 about here 
  The past 25 years have witnessed a steady progression of stricter child support 
enforcement.  Major pieces of legislation in 1975, 1984, and 1988 established and 
strengthened child support enforcement requirements, triggering a steep, upward trend in 
paternity establishment and child support collections for never married mothers and 
AFDC recipients.  Most recently, in 1996 PRWORA again tightened the screws on child 
support enforcement.  Our data in Table 2 contain indicators of the strictness of child 
support enforcement systems in our seven states in 1995 through 1997.  It is too soon to 
see the full effects of the 1996 legislation manifested in these numbers.  However, it is 
still possible to get a sense of which states are the strictest and which are the most lenient.   
Rows 1, 2, and 3 present data on the number of paternities established in 1995, 
1996, and 1997 divided by the number of non-marital births in those years.  The paternity 
establishment numbers are the least reliable indicators in Table 2 for a number of reasons.    19
California’s numbers are unbelievable because they are counting all married women 
receiving welfare as having established paternity. [check**].  For this reason, California 
is not included when we rank cites on strictness of paternity establishment.  In all cases 
there is ambiguity about whether voluntary, in-hospital paternity establishments are 
included in the counts.  This may even vary from state to state, biasing our comparisons.  
In addition, there are large fluctuations from year to year in some states.  This may have 
to do with the fact that some states are working through a backlog of cases. 
  Virginia stands out as the strictest state on paternity establishment.  Virginia has a 
high rate of voluntary, in-hospital paternity establishment.  In the early 1990s Virginia 
became very serious about paternity establishment. It is possible that the trend shown 
from 1995-1997 is a result of working through a backlog of cases.   
Next to Virginia, Pennsylvania has the highest paternity establishment rate.  
Because paternity may be established for children up to the age of 18, it is possible that 
the number of paternities established may exceed the number of out-of-wedlock births if 
a state made a concerted effort to establish paternity for older children in a given year.  
Nevertheless, we are skeptical of the 1997 rate in Pennsylvania, which far exceeds 100 
percent.  The remaining states have similar rates of paternity establishment. 
  The percent of TANF cases with a child support collection is the most important 
measure in Table 2, because it is likely to have the biggest effect on the relationship 
between the parents in the Fragile Families sample.  If the collection rate is high, we 
would expect unmarried parents to have an incentive to unite.  We have confidence in 
these numbers because states must track the number of cases with collections for 
administrative purposes, and the number of TANF cases in the denominator is also a   20
reliable number.  Virginia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania stand out as the strictest states. 
Texas stands out with the lowest collection rate.   
  Cases with collections (out of all eligible mothers in the state) measure the 
strength of child support enforcement in the state as a whole.  Since these numbers are 
based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) sample, we have more faith in numbers 
for large states.  Virginia has the highest rate, and Pennsylvania and Maryland are the 
next best.  The rest of the states are slightly lower.  Texas does not stand out as lowest on 
this measure. 
  The effectiveness ratio is a measure of the effectiveness of the Child Support 
Enforcement system in a state  – i.e., how much child support was actually collected 
relative to an estimate of what could be collected with perfect enforcement.  Here, 
Virginia and Maryland have the highest effectiveness ratios, and California has the 
lowest.   
  In summary, Virginia emerges as the state with the strictest child support 
enforcement regime on all measures.  Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Maryland each had 
relatively strict enforcement according to some of the measures.  Texas and California 
were generally the most lenient.  
 
Labor Markets 
  Table 3 presents data for our 7 cities and the U. S. as a whole on two indicators of 
labor market performance: unemployment rates in 1997, 1998, and 1999, and 
employment growth between 1997 and 1999. The economy in general was strong from 
1997-1999 in the nation as a whole, and in the seven Fragile Families cities.  The U.S.   21
unemployment rate fell from 4.9 percent in 1997 to 4.4 percent in 1999, and employment 
grew by 2.6 percent.  Austin, Richmond, and Oakland all have very tight labor markets.  
But, there is still quite a large difference between Oakland and Austin.  If Oakland's labor 
market is tight, Austin's is extremely tight.  Only Newark has a higher unemployment 
rate and lower employment growth rate than the national average, but employment 
growth rates in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Detroit are all below the national average. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Interactions and Extremes 
  Austin, Richmond, and Oakland represent extreme environments in terms of all 
three dimensions: welfare, child support, and labor market.  Austin has low welfare, lax 
child support enforcement, and negligible unemployment.  Richmond also has low 
welfare and unemployment--though neither is quite as extreme as in Austin. But when it 
comes to child support enforcement, Virginia and Texas are opposites.  Like Austin, 
Oakland has lax child support enforcement and low unemployment--though Oakland's 
labor market is not as phenomenally robust as Austin's.  But, when it comes to welfare, 
California and Texas are opposites. The extreme contrasts in these environments are 
important for they allow us to test whether such differences make a difference.  For 
example, to the extent that low welfare, low unemployment and strong child support 
enforcement promote work, co-habitation, and marriage amongst unwed couples, we 
would expect to find more work, co-habitation, and eventually marriage among unwed 
parents in Austin than in Oakland.  
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V.  Results from Survey Data in Austin and Oakland  
  In this section we present data from the Fragile Family baseline interviews in 
Austin, Texas and Oakland, California.8 We are currently in the field in five additional 
cities – Baltimore, Detroit, Newark, Philadelphia, and Richmond – but these data are not 
ready to be analyzed at present. We use data from Austin and Oakland to address 
questions about parents’ current incomes and sources of economic support, the 
capabilities of both unwed mothers and fathers, and the relationships between the parents. 
We present the data separately for couples who are cohabiting, not cohabiting but 
romantically involved, and no longer romantically involved. Results by relationship 
status are from pooled (unweighted) data from both cities.  
  Before presenting the results, it is useful to describe the race/ethnic composition 
and nativity status of our samples in Austin and Oakland.  In Austin, the sample is over 
50% Hispanic, nearly 30% black, and nearly 20% white.  In Oakland, the sample is over 
50% black, over 30% Hispanic, and only 3% white.  Compared to the nation as a whole, 
where about half of unwed births are to white parents, 30% to black parents, and less than  
20% to Hispanic parents, Oakland and Austin have relatively few unwed white births.  
These two cities also have higher proportions of immigrants than the rest of the country: 
one fifth of the Austin sample and nearly one third of the Oakland sample are 
immigrants.  
  Table 4 presents data on the incomes and sources of support of new unwed 
mothers. First, we discuss the findings for all unwed mothers in each city. Then we 
discuss variations by relationship status. In both cities incomes are low: slightly more 
than half the households in each city are poor.  Mean personal and household income is   23
higher in Oakland than in Austin.  Lower household income in Austin is traceable to the 
much larger proportion of very poor households (below 50% of the poverty line)—27% 
versus 16%. Austin has a much larger proportion of  households with incomes above 
200% of the poverty line—25% versus 15%. Some of this difference may be due to a 
peculiarity of the Oakland sample.  Oakland residents who belong to the Kaiser health 
care system give birth in a Kaiser hospital located outside Oakland, and therefore are not 
included in our sample.  While this omission primarily affects marital births, it is likely 
that some portion of the top part of the unwed birth distribution in Oakland is also 
missing because they gave birth in this “suburban” hospital. 
Table 4 about here 
  Welfare use is common in both cities, but higher in Oakland than in Austin. Over 
half of the mothers received AFDC or Food Stamps. Higher welfare benefits as well as 
more common receipt of benefits undoubtedly help account for the lower rate of extreme 
poverty in Oakland.  Other government transfers, housing assistance, and Medicaid are 
also all more common in Oakland than in Austin.  Medicaid paid for the cost of the 
child’s birth in over 90% of non-marital births in Oakland.  In Austin, the figure is only 
65%, but 26% of the Austin unwed mothers (not shown in table) had private insurance.  
Type of insurance is another indicator of the social class of unwed mothers in Austin.   
  Assistance from the mother’s family is even more common than welfare in 
Austin, and nearly as common as welfare in Oakland.  Indeed, in Austin more than three 
quarters of the mothers receiving welfare also received help from their relatives, while in 
Oakland the proportion was just under a half (not shown in table.)  Even more striking is 
that the most common form of all assistance for unwed mothers is financial support from   24
the father of the child.  Over three-quarters of the mothers received financial assistance 
from their child’s father.  For married couples, this pattern is exactly what we would 
expect.  That the patterns hold for unwed couples, at least during pregnancy, is 
noteworthy. Also noteworthy and a bit puzzling is the fact that financial support from 
fathers is 11 points higher in Oakland than in Austin. 
  Most, but not all, of the difference across relationship statuses are expected. 
Before discussing these findings, however, it is useful to note that 51% of the couples 
were cohabiting at birth, another 30% were romantically involved and living apart, and 
19% were no longer romantically involved. (The importance of these relationship status 
findings and variations across cities are discussed below in conjunction with Table 3.) 
Household income is higher and poverty is lower among unwed mothers who co-habit 
with the fathers of their children. Similarly assistance from government and the mother’s 
family are lower and assistance from fathers is higher amongst cohabiting mothers.  
Finally, 80% to 93% of the mothers who are romantically involved  receive financial 
assistance from the father as compared to just over 20% of the mothers who are no longer 
romantically involved. Surprising to us, at least, is the fact that nearly half of the 
cohabiting mothers receive AFDC or Food Stamps.  (In the baseline questionnaire we did 
not distinguish between AFDC and Food Stamps.)   
   So, what are the implications of these findings for welfare and child support 
policy?  First, the numbers suggest that a majority of unwed mothers will be affected by 
welfare reform and will potentially lose cash resources. Second, the child support 
provisions in PRWORA may also reduce, rather than increase, the resources available to 
at least a large minority of unwed mothers. Among unwed mothers who cohabit and   25
receive cash assistance – about 50 percent – half (or a quarter of all single mothers) stand 
to lose resources because of stronger child support enforcement. These mothers are 
already sharing the father’s income, and the child support collected from their partners 
will go to the state rather than to them. Second, an even larger group of mothers who are 
not cohabiting but who receive TANF or Food Stamps are also likely to lose resources 
because of stronger child support enforcement, at least in the short run. We know that 
60%  of these mothers received support for the father during pregnancy and if fathers 
substitute formal child support for informal support the mothers are likely to be worse 
off. Third, that over half of the mothers who received welfare also received financial help 
from their families both tells us that families are already providing support which raises 
the question of whether they can or will do more.  This question can only be answered 
with follow-up data.  In the next table, however, we examine mothers and fathers 
capacities to make up for the cuts in welfare. 
Table 5 about here 
  Table 5 presents data on the capabilities of unwed mothers and fathers in Austin 
and Oakland. Because we were able to interview only 75% of the unwed fathers, father-
reports may be biased. With the exception of wage rates, therefore, we use the mothers’ 
reports to measure fathers’ capabilities. (The agreement between mothers’ and fathers’ 
reports is quite high for couples for whom we have two interviews.)  Both mothers and 
fathers are relatively young: 60% of the mothers and 46% of the fathers are below age 25. 
Of even greater concern, nearly half the mothers and almost 40% of the fathers have not 
completed high school. Slightly less than one quarter of the parents have education 
beyond high school. None of this information bodes well for parents’ ability to support   26
themselves and their new babies.  On a more positive note, only a small proportion of 
either mothers or fathers report serious health problems or problems with alcohol or 
drugs.  Most of the mothers and fathers have had some work experience, but 12% and 5% 
respectively of the mothers and fathers have never worked.  Finally, the median wage rate 
is low--$6.25 and $8.00 per hour respectively for mothers and fathers.  Not shown in the 
table, only one quarter of the mothers earn $8.00 or more per hour and only one quarter 
of the fathers earn $10.00 or more.  In sum,, the capacities of these unwed parents to 
support themselves and their families vary, but on the whole are limited. 
  The city differences in capabilities are interesting. While the mothers and fathers 
in Austin are somewhat younger than those in Oakland, they also are better educated, 
healthier, and more likely to have worked during the last year.  The differences in 
employment rates are particularly interesting.  Both the lower level of welfare and the 
tighter labor market in Austin lead to higher employment rates. At this point, with only 
two cities to compare, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of welfare from those of 
the labor market, but these differences whet the appetite for the full Fragile Family 
sample.  (The employment rate differences could also be due to differences in human 
capital or to differences in sampling across the two cities.) Finally, note that wage rates of 
fathers are lower in Austin than Oakland, but that the reverse is true for the mothers.  
Given differences in the cost of living between the two cities, we would expect higher 
wage rates in Oakland.  The higher wage rate for mothers in Austin may be attributable to 
their greater labor market experience. 
  The capabilities of the parents, with two notable exceptions, vary in expected 
ways by relationship status.  Not surprisingly, cohabiting parents are somewhat less likely   27
to be under twenty and somewhat more likely to be over thirty than non cohabiting 
parents, but the differences are pretty small.  Both the mothers and fathers who cohabit 
are better educated than those who are romantically involved and living apart; but, 
surprisingly, the best educated parents are those who are not romantically involved.  It 
will be interesting to see if this relationship holds up in other cities. As expected, fathers 
who are no longer involved with the mother are less healthy, more likely to have a health 
problem that limits their work, and more likely to have a problem with alcohol or drugs 
than involved fathers. 
The most striking finding in the table is the variation in fathers’ employment rates 
by relationship status.  The percentage of fathers employed last year is 88% for 
cohabitors, 77% for fathers who are romantically involved with the mother, and only 
49% for fathers not romantically involved.  Note that cohabiting mothers also work more 
than mothers who do not cohabit.  Finally, it is also surprising that the hourly wage rates 
of cohabiting fathers are no higher than the wage rates of fathers who do not cohabit. 
This result may be attributable to non-response bias.  We interviewed approximately 90% 
of unwed cohabiting fathers, 60% of romantic fathers, and only 35% of fathers non-
romantic fathers. [check **]  If the fathers we interviewed had higher wage rates than 
those whom we did not interview,  the wage rates of the romantically involved and no 
longer romantically involved fathers would be too high.   
Table 6 about here 
  Table 6 presents data on the relationships, prospects for marriage, and father-
involvement. As described above, slightly more than half of unwed parents are cohabiting 
at the time their child is born, and another 30% are romantically involved with each   28
other.  Nearly 70% of the mothers believe they have a fifty-fifty chance or better of 
marrying the fathers and a similar number believe that marriage is better for kids. An 
even larger percentage of mothers report that the father’s name will be on the birth 
certificate, that the child will have the father’s surname, and that the father provided 
financial support during pregnancy and visited the mother and child in the hospital. 
Ninety one percent of the mothers say they want the father involved in raising the child!  
The proportions are even higher for fathers’ reports.  (The father reports are 
upwardly biased because fathers who are interviewed are likely to be more committed to 
their children than fathers who are not interviewed.  But in cases where both the mother 
and father are interviewed, they report similar high values.)  Finally, nearly 100% of the 
fathers interviewed agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "Losing a chance to 
be part of my child's life would be one of the worst things that could happen to me."  In 
short, the overwhelming majority of the mothers and fathers in fragile families have high 
hopes and good intentions.   
  Variations by city and relationship status are once again quite interesting.  Austin, 
as compared to Oakland, has a higher proportion of cohabiting parents -- 56% versus 
47% -- but a lower proportion of parents who are romantically involved (77% versus 
87%).  Consistent with the lower proportion of romantically involved couples, Austin 
mothers and fathers also report lower father-child involvement. Not surprisingly, the 
variation by relationship status is far more dramatic.  Of mothers who cohabit, over 90% 
expect to marry the father, among those not cohabiting but romantically involved, nearly 
70% expect to marry the father, but only 4% of those no longer romantically involved 
expect to marry the father.  The cohabiting and romantically involved fathers are a bit   29
more optimistic.  Quite surprisingly, nearly half of the non-romantic fathers retain high 
hopes of marriage. No doubt these high hopes contributed to their willingness to be part 
of our study. Note that among the fathers who are no longer romantically involved, the 
proportion of men who said they would help support the child is larger  than the 
proportion who actually provided support during the pregnancy, suggesting that talk is 
“cheap.”  
 
VI.  Conclusions 
From our initial exploration of the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being data 
two findings stand out. First, unwed parents in both cities are highly committed to each 
other and to their children, at least initially. Half of unwed parents live together, and 
another 30% are romantically involved with each other. More than two thirds expect to 
marry. Eight out of ten fathers provided support during the pregnancy, and more than 
eight of ten mothers plan to put the father’s name on the birth certificate. The 
overwhelming majority of mothers want the father to be involved in raising their child.  
The challenge for policy makers and community leaders is to nourish rather than 
undermine these commitments.   
Second, most unmarried parents in both cities are poorly equipped to support their 
families. The typical father has an income of less than $12,500 dollars a year and the 
typical mother has only $4000 to $5000. The human capital of both parents is low. 
Nearly half of mothers and fathers lack a high school degree. Less than 20% have more 
than a high school degree. In Oakland, nearly one out of four fathers and two out of five 
mothers did not work in the previous year.  Increases in human capital, employment, and   30
earnings are likely to play critical roles in the success or failure of parents in maintaining 
stable families. 
Finally, although it is too early to draw conclusions about how policy regimes 
affect parents’ relationships and capabilities, our initial examination of state and city 
policies indicate that PRWORA is a heterogeneous set of initiatives that are being 
implemented under very different labor market conditions. At one extreme are cities like 
Richmond, Virginia, where welfare benefits are low, time limits and work requirements 
are strict, child support enforcement is strong and unemployment rates are low. At 
another extreme are cities like Oakland, California where welfare benefits are high, time 
limits and work requirements are weak, child support enforcement is weak, and 
unemployment rates are higher. When we revisit the parents in these two cities in 12 
months, we would expect to find more working parents and more marriage and 
cohabitation in Richmond than in Oakland. With data from 20 different policy regimes, 
we will soon able to bring empirical evidence to bear on these predictions.    31
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                        
 
1  Sara McLanahan (Princeton University) and Irwin Garfinkel (Columbia University) 
are principal Investigators. Jeanne Brooks-Gunn (Columbia) and Marta Tienda 
(Princeton) are co-investigators, and Angus Deaton and Burton Singer are statistical 
consultants. Nancy Reichman is the Project Director. Other co-investigators include a 
network of (primarily) minority scholars at seven different universities and research 
institutes:  Sheila Ards at Benedict College, Waldo Johnson at the University of Chicago, 
Yolanda Padilla at the University of Texas, Lauren Rich at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Mark Turner at the Urban Institute, Melvin Wilson at the University of 
Virginia, and Maureen Waller at the Public Policy Institute of California. 
 
2  We must approach these figures cautiously, however, since the statistics are based on 
special populations (i.e. welfare mothers) and do not distinguish between biological and 
social fathers. 
 
3  This problem was first identified by Cherlin, Griffith, and McCarthy (1983). 
 
4  Willis (1996) offers an economic explanation for the same behavior. He argues that 
unmarried women allow men to "free ride" (in terms of supporting their children) when 
there is a surplus of women and when women have an alternative source of support (e.g. 
welfare). 
 
5  Though economic theory does not yield general conclusions about the effects of 
stronger child support enforcement on non-marital births or divorce, in conditions which 
pertain in the US today, theory predicts deterrence effects.  Stronger enforcement 
increases the income of the custodial or resident parent and reduces the income of the 
non-resident parent.  To simplify, yet account for most cases, we call resident parents 
mothers and non-resident parents, fathers.  If child support enforcement is tougher, 
mothers will be more prone to parent a child out-of-wedlock and divorce, while fathers 
will be less prone to do either.  Which effect will dominate cannot be ascertained in 
general.  But Nixon (1997) shows that if there is a welfare or public assistance system, 
theory predicts stronger enforcement reduces divorce. Similarly, Willis (1994) finds that 
in the presence of welfare and a shortage of males, theory predicts stronger enforcement 
reduces non-marital births.  One simple though not quite full story is that amongst 
couples where the mother would go on welfare if she had a non-marital birth or divorced, 
welfare removes or at least reduces the benefit of strong enforcement.  Thus the effects of 
enforcement on the incomes of these mothers and fathers is asymmetrical.  In short, 
previous research suggests that in conditions which pertain in the US today, economic 
theory predicts stronger child support enforcement will reduce non-marital births and 
divorce. 
 
6  In the first two cities – Oakland and Austin – we were able to interview about 58 
percent of the unmarried fathers at the hospital.  
   36
                                                                                                                                                                     
7  TANF data are not available at the city level.  Therefore, we use data at the county 
level. 
 
8  Each city sample contains 325 families, 250 unmarried couples plus 75 married 
couples who serve as a comparison group. Data were collected in Oakland at Summit and 
Highland hospitals from February 14 through June 15, 1998 and in Austin at all birthing 
hospitals from April 9th through June 30th. Mothers giving birth during this time were 
approached in the hospitals and asked to participate in the study. Approximately 93% of 
the mothers agreed to participate. Mothers were asked to provide locating information on 
the fathers, and fathers were contacted either in the hospitals or as soon as possible after 
the child’s birth. Approximately 90% of married fathers and 75% of unmarried fathers 
agreed to participate in the study. The mother’s interview lasted about 30 minutes and the 
father’s interview lasted 40 minutes. At the time we conducted the survey, women could 
go to two hospitals in Oakland to deliver a baby (Highland and Summit).  However, 
before 1998, Kaiser Hospital in Oakland also performed deliveries.  At the time of the 
study, women who were Kaiser patients were taken to Alta Bates Hospital in Berkeley 
for deliveries. 
 Table 1
Welfare Indicators for 7 Fragile Family City, States
Austin, Balt., Detroit Newark, Oakland, Phila., Richmond,
TX MD MI NJ CA PA VA
State TANF grant amount




County child poverty rate,
1995 (%) 19.5 36.3 34.8 24.6 17.3 37.4 41.8
Number of TANF cases in county
per 1000 county residents,  5.9 38.1 26.8 28.4 18.6 42.4 23.3
1998
Percent change in county
TANF caseload, 1997-1999 -36.5 -26.9 -32.0 -20.8 -20.9 -19.5 -19.4
Applications denied in county,
1998 (%) 57.3 46.9 35.2 8.5 42.3 19.1 22.5
State Restrictions on eligibility:
Lifetime TANF time limit 1,2, or 3 yrs
b
5 years none 5 years 5 years 5 years 2 years
c
TANF terminated or
reduced after time limit terminated
d
reduced n/a terminated reduced terminated terminated
Full family sanctions no yes yes yes no yes yesAustin, Balt., Detroit Newark, Oakland, Phila., Richmond,
TX MD MI NJ CA PA VA
County TANF recipients who
who worked, 1998 (%) 4.5 17.9 30.0 7.9 39.6 14.9 48.1
Number of subsidized child care slots
per child under 5 in county  0.02 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.19 0.07 0.18
State offers Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) no yes no no no no no
Welfare Indicators for 7 Fragile Family City, States, Continued
Source: Urban Institute, Census web site, and data collected from state or county TANF and child care departments.  
Notes:   
a Benefit levels vary by county or city in PA and VA.  Amount shown applies to the largest portion of the state.
b Texas assigns time limits based on employability, e.g., those deemed most employable are assigned a 1-year time 
limit and those deemed least employable are assigned a 3-year limit.
c In Virginia, benefits are terminated after 2 years, but a family can reapply after 2-3 years.
d In Texas benefits are reduced after the 1, 2, or 3 year limit and terminated after 5 years.Table 2
Child Support Enforcement Indicators for 7 Fragile Family City, States
TX MD MI NJ CA PA VA
(Austin) (Balt.) (Detr.) (Newk.) (Oakl.) (Phila.) (Rich.)
Paternities established per out-of-wedlock birth
1995 39.8 37.5 48.6 41.7 73.2 56.2 96.8
1996 43.0 45.6 55.3 46.2 108.3 61.7 71.2
1997 43.5 54.1 39.7 39.6 116.4 171.1 43.0
TANF cases with collections as percent of TANF caseload
1995 11.3 27.1 39.1 33.1 18.7 36.5 64.8
1996 12.9 27.9 48.0 36.9 24.9 41.3 34.3
1997 14.2 29.3 54.3 37.8 30.7 42.4 30.3
Cases with collections as percent of all eligibles in the state
a
1995 30.6 33.4 31.1 26.1 22.9 38.2 40.1
1996 32.0 36.9 30.0 24.7 23.4 35.8 48.1
1997 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Effectiveness ratio for all eligibles in the state
b
1995 17.8 24.1 16.5 16.2 11.6 17.9 24.7
1996 17.3 24.2 17.9 16.4 10.8 18.9 21.7
1997 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Sources:  Number of out-of-wedlock births are from Vital Statistics.  TANF caseload sizes 
are from the Administration for Children and Families web site.  The rest of the numbers are 
from the Office of Child Support Enforcement's 1995, 1996, and 1997 Annual Reports, and 
our calculations from the Current Population Survey.
Notes:  
a "All eligibles" is defined as the number of single mothers in the state who are not 
widows.
b The Effectiveness ratio is the amount of child support collected in the state divided by an 
estimate of the total amount of support for which single mothers were eligible.Table 3
Labor Market Indicators for 7 Fragile Families Cities
Austin,  Baltim.,  Detroit, Newark,Oakland, Phila., Richmd,
TX     MD     MI     NJ     CA     PA    VA     U.S.
Unemployment rate (%)
1997 3.2 5.6 4.7 6.5 4.3 4.9 3.5 4.9
1998 2.8 5.1 4.3 5.6 3.9 4.3 2.6 4.5
1999 2.4 4.3 4.4 5.6 3.5 4.0 2.4 4.4
Employment Growth (%)
1997-1999 8.4 1.1 1.9 1.5 4.3 0.7 5.9 2.6
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics web site: www.bls.gov
Notes:    Labor market statistics are not seasonally adjusted.
County-level labor market statistics are based on a combination of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) records and survey (CPS and CES) data.  U.S. labor market statistics are 
based on the CPS.All Moms All Moms All Unwed Moms Cohabiting Romantic Other
Austin Oakland
Personal Income 4000 5000 4122 5000 3560 4000
Household Income 14050 15772 14679 16883 12971 13631
Poverty Status
<50% 27% 16% 22% 19% 25% 26%
50% to 100% 26% 40% 33% 33% 32% 33%
100% to 200% 22% 29% 25% 27% 24% 19%
>200% 25% 15% 21% 21% 18% 22%
Government Assitance
% with  AFDC or food stamps 43% 52% 48% 47% 51% 46%
% with  other government transfers 5% 13% 9% 8% 13% 3%
% with housing assistance 17% 24% 17% 14% 24% 16%
% with Medicaid 65% 91% 78% 77% 84% 72%
Family Assistance
% with financial help from family 58% 46% 52% 44% 60% 63%
% with housing from family 41% 44% 42% 28% 56% 60%
% with financial help from dad 72% 83% 77% 93% 80% 28%
% with "other" help from dad 73% 79% 76% 98% 73% 19%
Table 4: Mothers Circumstances:  Income and Sources of SupportAll Moms All Moms All Unwed
Austin Oakland Moms Cohabiting Romantic Other
Age  
<20 24% 19% 21% 19% 26% 21%
20-24 45% 34% 39% 44% 34% 34%
25-29 17% 28% 23% 22% 23% 23%
30+ 15% 19% 17% 15% 17% 21%
Education
<high school 45% 52% 48% 48% 54% 41%
high school 28% 31% 30% 30% 28% 30%
some college 22% 15% 19% 17% 16% 26%
college degree or more 5% 2% 3% 5% 1% 3%
%Fair or poor health 39% 41% 10% 12% 10% 3%
%With drug or alcohol problem 1% 6% 4% 2% 6% 4%
%Worked last year 81% 55% 68% 72% 61% 67%
Never worked 4% 19% 12% 11% 15% 7%
Hourly wage (median) $6.49 $6.00 $6.25 $6.16 $6.63 $6.00
All Dads All Dads All Unwed 
Austin Oakland Dads Cohabiting Romantic Other
Age
<20 11% 9% 10% 9% 10% 12%
20-24 41% 30% 36% 37% 34% 34%
25-29 24% 29% 27% 25% 27% 33%
30+ 24% 19% 28% 29% 29% 22%
Education
<high school 39% 38% 39% 43% 31% 37%
high school 32% 42% 37% 31% 51% 32%
some college 24% 18% 21% 22% 16% 27%
college degree or more 4% 2% 3% 4% 2% 4%
% Fair or poor health 27% 37% 8% 8% 6% 12%
% With health problem limit work 8% 7% 6% 14%
%With drug or alcohol problem 9% 6% 6% 7% 4% 9%
% Worked last year 90% 77% 77% 88% 76% 49%
Never worked 0% 10% 5% 3% 9% 4%
Hourly wage on last job $7.78 $8.42 $8.00 $8.00 $8.25 $8.17
(median for men who worked)
Table 5: Capabilities of Mothers and Fathers
MOTHERS
FATHERSAll Moms All Moms All Unwed
Austin Oakland Moms Cohabiting Romantic Other
Percent Cohabiting 47% 56% 52%
Percent Romantic 39% 21% 30%
Percent Other  14% 23% 19%
Chance of marriage
(50% or greater)
                   Mothers report 67% 70% 69% 92% 69% 4%
                   Fathers report 89% 82% 85% 95% 76% 45%
Marriage better for kids
(%Agree or Strongly agree)
                   Mothers report 72% 70% 71% 73% 68% 68%
                   Fathers report 80% 76% 78% 81% 70% 79%
Father's name on Birth 
Certificate (mother report) 81% 89% 83% 93% 86% 50%
Child will have Father's 
Surname (mother report) 80% 89% 75% 86% 73% 47%
Want Father Involved 
(mother report) 89% 92% 91% 100% 94% 60%
Father Financial 
Contribution During  72% 83% 77% 93% 80% 28%
Father Visit Hospital 
(mother report) 71% 77% 74% 92% 69% 33%
Fathers Agree to Support 
Child (mother report) 29% 34% 31% N.A.* 73% 38%
Fathers Values Fatherhood 
(father report) 99% 97% 97% 98% 96% 97%
*Not Applicable - Mothers who report that they live with the father (Q. B20 in mother's questionnaires) 
are skipped out of  this question
Table 6: Relationships and Pertinent Values in Fragile Families